


Features and concepts of Privacy-ABCs




Gregory Neven, IBM Research – Zurich

Trusted attribute transfer



Existing solutions with online issuer

e.g., SAML, WS-Federation, OpenID,
Facebook Connect,...




Privacy & security risks:

- Big Brother Issuer: involved in every transaction
- User linkable across verifiers (usually)
- User database & issuance key on online server

Existing solutions with offline issuer


e.g., X.509 v3 certificates



Privacy risks:

- Always reveal full attributes
- Linkable across verifiers by certificate

Privacy-preserving Attribute-Based Credentials (Privacy-ABCs)




In this talk:

- Credential issuance
- Presentation & pseudonyms
- Inspection
- Revocation


Credential

- list of attribute-value pairs
- certified by issuer
- Advanced issuance:
 - blindly issued attributes
 - carried-over attributes



Presentation policy (token) requests (reveals)

- selected attributes from credential(s)
- predicates over attributes
attribute₁ =, >, < attribute₂ or constant
- *pseudonyms*
 - ≈ unlinkable public keys for user's secret key
 - intentionally create limited linkability (e.g., account creation)
 - scope-exclusive* pseudonym: unique yet unlinkable



Inspection

- Attribute value encrypted to trusted inspector
- Token bound to *inspection grounds*: conditions to decrypt
- E.g., de-anonymization in case of abuse

Revocation

- Render credentials unusable for presentation
- E.g., credential compromise, changed attributes

- Privacy by default
 - Unlinkable authentication
 - Selective attribute disclosure
 - Attribute predicates
- Linkability/identification when required
 - Pseudonyms
 - Inspection
- Easy integration into applications
 - XML schema specifications
 - Web service APIs
 - Open-source (EPL) implementation: <https://github.com/p2abcengine>
- Learn more
 - <http://www.abc4trust.eu>
 - Longer talk in Track 7 (eAuthentication)